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Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of
Police Officers' Subpoenaed Testimony After Garcetti
v. Ceballos
Over forty years ago, Pickering v. Board of Education established that the
speech of government employees who address a matter of public concern may
be protected under the First Amendment.1 In 20o6, the Supreme Court
significantly reduced the scope of that protection with its holding in Garcetti v.
Ceballos that a government employee is not insulated from employer discipline
for statements made pursuant to his official duties.' After Garcetti, the lower
courts have had to determine, as a threshold inquiry, whether government
employees who seek the protection of the First Amendment spoke as
employees or as citizens.'
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg has
created a circuit split as to whether a police officer who testifies truthfully
regarding information learned on the job in response to a subpoena speaks as a
citizen or as an employee.4 In the immediate aftermath of Garcetti, the Third
and Seventh Circuits each held that a police officer who testifies truthfully in
1. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see also United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 465-66 (1995); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 142-43 (1983).
2. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.").
3. See, e.g., Chaldos v. Stevens, 56o F.3d 705, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Garcetti requires a
threshold determination regarding whether the public employee spoke in his capacity as a
private citizen or as an employee.").
4. 574 F. 3 d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
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response to a subpoena about information learned on the job speaks as a citizen
and, therefore, his testimony is protected under the First Amendment.' In
Huppert, the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of its sister circuits and held
that such an officer speaks as an employee. The underlying disagreement
among the courts of appeals is whether a police officer who testifies truthfully
does so pursuant to the duty every citizen has to provide truthful testimony' or
pursuant to an overlapping duty police officers have in virtue of their
employment as police officers.
Judge William Fletcher's dissenting opinion in Huppert invites a narrow
holding not adopted by any circuit: classify a government employee's
testimony as the speech of a citizen when the employee's subpoenaed
testimony bears on a fellow employee's corruption. This Comment argues that
this subset of testimony should be eligible for First Amendment protection
under Garcetti. Part I reviews the majority and dissenting opinions in Huppert
and criticizes these opinions for failing to grapple with the possibility that
police officers may have a duty to give testimony in response to a subpoena
both in virtue of their citizenship and in virtue of their employment as police
officers. Part II argues that, under Garcetti's distinction between citizen and
employee speech, testimony should be classified as citizen speech. Part III
recognizes that the "purpose of Garcetti was to allow government employers
greater influence over speech that owes [its] existence to a public employee's
professional responsibilities and that is damaging to the government's capacity
to conduct public business "7 and argues that a government employer's interest
in controlling employee speech is at its lowest ebb when employees give
truthful testimony that sheds light on the corruption of colleagues in response
to a subpoena.
I. HUPPERT V. CITY OF PITTSBURG
In 2004, Ron Huppert, a thirteen-year veteran of the Pittsburg, California
Police Department (PPD) was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
investigating corruption within the PPD. Although an FBI Agent working on
the case assured Huppert that his actions in connection with the investigation
5. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590
(7th Cir. 2007).
6. See, e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) ("Every citizen... owes to
his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.").
7. Morales, 494 F. 3d at 598.
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"were as an individual and not in [his] capacity as a member of the PPD," s the
fact of Huppert's testimony was well known within the PPD. The Chief of
Police for the PPD "told [Huppert] he knew [Huppert] had testified before the
grand jury.'"' Sometime after Huppert testified before the grand jury, he was
transferred from gang crime to frauds and forgeries, a less desirable
assignment. Huppert's new supervisor instituted a policy requiring Huppert to
write a report to close every case, criticized Huppert for minor errors, refused
to allow Huppert to wear an outdated badge although other officers were
permitted to do so, joked about firing Huppert, and removed a positive yearly
evaluation from Huppert's file. Huppert brought a § 1983 suit alleging that the
police department had violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating
against him in response to his grand jury testimony. The district court held
that because Huppert's grand jury testimony was the speech of an employee
and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment under Garcetti, he had
no 5 1983 claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
A. Judge Tallman's Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Tallman, held that Huppert's
grand jury testimony was the speech of an employee because Huppert had a
duty, as a police officer, to testify in front of a grand jury investigating crime.' °
To support the proposition that such a duty exists, Judge Tallman cited an
"oft-quoted passage"' from a 1939 California Court of Appeal opinion, Christal
v. Police Commission of City and County of San Francisco,'2 that includes among
the duties of a police officer the duty to "testify freely" about incriminating
facts in front of a grand jury investigating crime. 3 Reasoning from the premise
that Huppert's employment as a police officer generated a duty to testify in
front of the grand jury, Judge Tallman concluded that "any speech Huppert
8. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 713.
9. Id. at 700.
1o. Id. at 707.
ii. Id.
12. 92 P.2d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
13. Id. at 419 ("When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which will tend to incriminate
any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to their superiors and to testify freely
concerning such facts when called upon to do so before any duly constituted court or grand
jury. It is for the performance of these duties that police officers are commissioned and paid
by the community .... ").
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gave during his grand jury testimony was 'pursuant to his duties as a police
officer"' and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment.
1 4
Judge Tallman explicitly rejected the Third Circuit's approach in Reilly v.
City of Atlantic City."s In Reilly, an Atlantic City police officer testified against
another police officer accused of running a prostitution ring. Because the
substance of the officer's testimony was learned on the job, the question
presented by Reilly was "whether truthful trial testimony arising out of [an]
employee's official responsibilities constitutes protected speech. ',, 6 The Third
Circuit held that because offering truthful testimony at trial is the
responsibility of every citizen, a government employee who testifies "is not
simply performing his or her job duties; rather, [he or she] is acting as a
citizen."17 In other words, if a government employee has both a duty as an
employee and a duty as a citizen to give truthful testimony, his testimony will
be citizen speech under Reilly. Judge Tallman argued that the Third Circuit's
decision to classify all truthful testimony as citizen speech, regardless of
whether the testimony arose out of the witness's job duties, is incompatible
with Garcetti, which "drew a distinct line between speech pursuant to one's job
duties and speech in a private capacity. " " He accused the Reily court of
"chipping away at the plain holding" of Garcetti. 9 He failed to acknowledge or
engage with the question of whether citizenship gives rise to a duty to give
14. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708. Judge Tallman's reliance on Christal and its progeny is surprising
given that, as he recognizes, Garcetti instructed that any inquiry into whether an employee
spoke pursuant to his official duties should be "practical and look beyond the job description
to the duties the employee actually performs." Id, at 704. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court
indicated that "the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description is neither
necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task in an employee's
professional duties for First Amendment purposes." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425
(2006). It is not obvious that a police officer has a duty, as a police officer, to report or
testify about corruption within the police department that employs him. In Morales v. Jones,
a police officer "testified that, as a police officer, he could not do anything with his
information or his suspicions" of corruption within the police department; he "had to give
[the evidence of police corruption] to someone outside the police department." 494 F.3d
590, 6oo-oi (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Chief of Police of the same department, an alleged participant in the corruption, agreed that
officers were not expected to report corruption within the department to a superior. Id. But
see Christal, 92 P.2d at 419 ("When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which will tend
to incriminate any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to their superiors . ).
IS. 532 F.3 d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 230.
17. Id. at 231 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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truthful testimony and, if so, whether a police officer can ever give testimony in
a criminal case pursuant to that duty.
Judge Tallman sought to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Morales v. Jones on the grounds that the testimony at issue there was given
during a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding.20 In Morales, a Milwaukee
police officer testified about a chief of police's mistreatment of a fellow officer
in a civil suit. Although the Seventh Circuit observed in Morales that testifying
in a civil suit in response to a subpoena is "unquestionably" not among a police
officer's job duties,2 it did not regard this finding to be dispositive of the
question of whether Morales's testimony was the speech of a citizen or
employee. The question presented in Morales was whether the fact that Morales
had testified about statements he had made "pursuant to his official duties"
transformed his otherwise protected testimony into unprotected employee
speech.2" Because the Seventh Circuit held that it did not, Morales, like Reilly,
stands for the proposition that the fact that the substance of a police officer's
testimony arose out of the performance of his job duties does not render his
testimony employee speech.
B. Judge Fletcher's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that Huppert's grand jury testimony
ought to be classified as citizen speech. Observing that a government employee
has "a duty as a citizen" to give grand jury testimony in response to a subpoena
that is "independent of any duty he or she might also have as an employee" to
give the same testimony, Judge Fletcher reasoned that a government employee
who testifies in front of a grand jury is "not performing an official duty within
the meaning of [Garcetti]." 21 Rather, the testifying government employee is
"exercising a right guaranteed to any citizen in a democratic society regardless
of his status as a government employee."' He characterized Morales and Reilly
as standing for the proposition that a government employee who has an
"independent legal duty" to speak "has First Amendment protection for speech
uttered in the performance of that independent legal duty."2" Judge Fletcher,
like the majority, failed to grapple with the possibility that Huppert may have
20. 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007).
21. Id. at 598.
22. Id.
23. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 721 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 722 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
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had a freestanding duty to testify truthfully in front of the grand jury from two
different sources, namely, his position as a police officer and his status as a
citizen. However, Judge Fletcher's description of the duty an employee has as a
citizen to give testimony as distinctly "independent" suggests that he may
believe this duty outweighs any overlapping duties the employee has in virtue
of his employment for the purposes of determining whether an employee's
testimony is citizen speech or employee speech under Garcetti. Although Judge
Fletcher's argument is capable of supporting the broad claim that all testimony
should be classified as citizen speech, he concluded only that the majority
should have held that "when an officer testifies before a grand jury pursuant to
a subpoena concerning corruption by his or her fellow officers, the officer is
not performing an official duty within the meaning of [Garcetti].,26
II. THE POLICE OFFICER AS WITNESS
Garcetti created an "artificial dichotomy" between a government employee
in the role of citizen and in the role of employee. 7 Huppert is a hard case
because a police officer arguably has both a duty as a citizen and a duty as an
employee to provide truthful testimony about information learned on the job
in response to a subpoena. 8 Consequently, he can be seen as adopting either or
both roles while on the stand. If the officer's testimony must be classified as
either citizen or employee speech under Garcetti, the question presented by
Huppert is not "Which duty-generating role gave rise to the duty to speak in
this case ?" but rather, "Which duty-generating role controls in this case ?" This
Part argues that when a police officer provides truthful testimony, he should be
understood to speak as a citizen under Garcetti.
The view that a police officer who gives testimony speaks as an employee is
motivated by the idea that an employee cannot speak as a citizen about
26. Id.
27. Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really Public Employees? In the Aftermath
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 92, 96 (20o8); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 340 (2oo6)
(describing the distinction between individuals speaking as citizens and as employees as
"false and unprecedented"). Others have observed that public employees identify as both
citizens and public employees even when performing their official duties. See Cynthia
Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a First Amendment
Problem, 2006 SuP. CT. REv. 115, 153; Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and
the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REv. 433, 455 (2009).
z8. For a discussion of the duty of citizens to give testimony when called upon to do so
regardless of occupation, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 7o8-1o (1974); and
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972).
2148
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information he had an obligation to gather and use on the job. In Garcetti, the
Supreme Court observed that a government employee does not act as a citizen
when he engages in daily professional activities. A government employee who
goes to work and performs the tasks he is paid to perform acts as an employee.
Restricting speech that "owes its existence" to a government employee's
professional activities "does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen" because these limitations merely "reflect[] the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created."29 Although it would be strange to consider Huppert's testimony as
"commissioned" by the PPD or as "work product" that he created in the course
of the daily, professional activities for which he was paid by the PPD, it is
evident that but for being a police officer Huppert would not have been in a
position to provide useful testimony regarding corruption within the PPD. In
this sense, the substance of Huppert's testimony "owe[d] its existence" to
Huppert's job as a police officer.
A police officer who gives truthful testimony acts primarily as a citizen even
if the substance of his testimony is fairly characterized as "ow[ing] its
existence" to his employment as a police officer. As Judge Fletcher signaled in
his dissent to Huppert, a police officer's duty as a citizen to provide testimony
can be described as distinctly "independent" because it preexists his adoption
of the role of police officer and cannot be overridden by his superiors. Because
"the citizen's obligation to testify truthfully is no weaker when one is employed
by the government, '3' an officer's superiors' ability to influence his testimony
flows in only one direction. While the officer's superiors can impose a
repetitive layer of duty on top of the officer's preexisting obligation to provide
truthful testimony, they cannot impose a contrary duty on the officer to lie or
disobey the subpoena.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that public employees do not shed
their First Amendment rights simply because they are employed by the
government."1 It would be incongruous for an employer's decision to include
fulfilling a preexisting duty to speak among an employee's job duties to entitle
the employer to retaliate against the employee for speech that would otherwise
29. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
30. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F. 3d 216, 231 (3 d Cir. 2008).
31. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) ("[A] State cannot condition public
employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of expression."); cf. Reilly, 532 F. 3d at 231 ("[T]he First Amendment protection
associated with fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one's status as a public
employee.").
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be protected by the First Amendment.32 An employer should not be permitted
to weaken the protections available to an individual by creating a repetitive
layer of duty that does not add to the employee's actual job duties.
Moreover, Garcetti's explication of the distinction between citizen and
employee speech supports the view that testimony is citizen speech. In Garcetti,
the Supreme Court assumed that "[w]hen a public employee speaks pursuant
to his employment responsibilities ... there is no relevant analogue to speech
by citizens who are not government employees." 3  Government employees'
public statements made "outside the course of performing their official duties"
are protected by the First Amendment "because [making public statements] is
the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government. "'
4
This explanation of the boundaries of protected speech suggests that giving
testimony should not be understood to be employee speech because there is a
relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees;
citizens who are and who are not government employees have a duty to, and
regularly do, testify in front of grand juries in response to subpoenas.3" More
broadly, these statements suggest that an employee who speaks as part of an
activity that all citizens have a duty to engage in speaks as a citizen.
III.GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS'S INTEREST IN INFLUENCING
EMPLOYEE SPEECH
The unique strength of Judge Fletcher's proposed holding is that it singles
out the subset of testimony by government employees for which the policy
rationale for leaving employee speech unprotected is weakest. 6 The Supreme
32. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 722 (9 th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
("The fact that the employer may require its employees to obey a law that exists
independent of the employment relationship does not allow the employer to retaliate against
an employee for obeying that law."); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech,
Categorical Balancing and 5 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 561,
581 (2008) (expressing concern that public employers will be able to "have it both ways:
they can require their employees to report official misbehavior and illegal conduct, and at
the same time avoid First Amendment protection for employees who do so").
33. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
34. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
35. At least one lower court has read Garcetti this way. See Skrutski v. Marut, No.
3:CV-03-2280, 2006 WL 2660691, at *1o (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2006) (finding that a public
employee speaks as a citizen when a private citizen "possibly could" have engaged in the
same speech).
36. George Rutherglen has suggested that a "realistic goal" of First Amendment jurisprudence
might be to "identify those management interests that actually and legitimately support
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Court observed in Pickering that the challenge presented by government
employee speech cases "is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through employees."37 In Garcetti, the Supreme
Court explained that this balance is achieved when government employees who
speak on matters of public concern "face only those speech restrictions that are
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively." s8 This Part
argues that government employers' ability to discipline employees who testify
about the corruption of colleagues in response to a subpoena does not
significantly promote the efficient and effective working of government, but
rather risks undermining it by suppressing truth telling.
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that a deputy district attorney's
memorandum recommending that his office drop a case because of police
misconduct constituted employee speech and, hence, was not protected by the
First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy offered three
policy reasons for leaving employee speech unprotected. First, government
employers, "like private employers, need a significant degree of control over
their employees' words and actions."39 If the First Amendment were
interpreted to give government employees "a right to perform their jobs
however they see fit ' 40 and thereby to "constitutionalize the employee
grievance, '41 there would be "little chance for the efficient provision of public
services."42 Second, government employers must be able to ensure that
communications by employees whose speech will be, or is likely to be,
interpreted as official speech are "accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and
government restrictions on the speech of its employees." George Rutherglen, Public
Emplryee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129, 168 (20o8).
37. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In Pickering, the speech at issue was a teacher's letter to a local
newspaper addressing issues such as the funding policies of the school board. Because the
letter had not been shown to interfere either with the teacher's performance of his daily
duties or the regular operation of the schools, the Court concluded that "the interest of the
school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is
not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of
the general public." Id. at 573.
38. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 418.
40. Id. at 422.
41. Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
42. Id. at 408.
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promote the employer's mission."4" Accordingly, a supervisor ought to have
"the authority to take proper corrective action" if an employee's speech is
"inflammatory or misguided."'  Third, displacing government employers'
managerial discretion with judicial supervision "would commit state and
federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial
oversight of communications between and among government employees and
their superiors in the course of official business."4
Classifying a government employee's subpoenaed testimony about the
corruption of colleagues as citizen speech would not implicate either the second
or third of the Court's policy reasons for leaving employee speech unprotected
in Garcetti. The tableau of colleagues testifying for or against one another in
front of a jury suggests an atmosphere of internal conflict within a government
department. The department would be free to claim that neither the defendant
nor the witness represented the views of the department. Or, the department
could support one employee and not the other. Furthermore, while a rule
prohibiting government employers from disciplining an employee who gives
testimony about the corruption of colleagues would displace a manager's
discretion under a clearly defined set of facts, courts would not have
to adopt a "permanent" and "intrusive" role in overseeing communications
between government employees and their supervisors. At most, courts would
oversee communications between government employees and their supervisors
when an employee has been subpoenaed to testify about the corruption of a
colleague. A court might limit its inquiry to cases in which there is evidence
that the supervisor is aware of the subpoena or of the fact that the employee
has given testimony against a colleague.
Only the first of Garcetti's policy reasons for leaving employee speech
unprotected- that a government employer must be able to control its
employees in order to effectively and efficiently provide government services to
the public -is potentially furthered by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Huppert.
In Huppert, the PPD and the FBI disagreed as to whether Huppert's testimony
enhanced the efficient and effective provision of police protection to the public
(by bringing to light corruption within the PPD) or undermined it (by
43. Id. at 422-23. Lawrence Rosenthal has observed that Garcetti is "premised on a recognition
that some public institutions cannot achieve otherwise constitutionally legitimate
objectives-and therefore cannot be fairly held politically accountable for the manner in
which they pursue such objectives -unless they are afforded the ability to control the speech
of those within those institutions." Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law
of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 33, 86-87 (2008).
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
45. Id. at 424.
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disrupting the internal workings of the PPD). There is good reason to believe
that subpoenaed testimony about the corruption of close colleagues is
especially likely to bring to light corruption and unlikely to undermine the
internal workings of a government employer. The testimony of the subpoenaed
government employee has the potential to be uniquely useful to the factfinder.
In contrast to the whistleblower who comes forward after being terminated,
demoted, or denied a promotion, the subpoenaed employee is a reluctant
whistleblower whose testimony is likely untainted by personal grievances, and
because the subject of this testimony is the on-duty conduct of his colleagues,
he is uniquely positioned to provide incriminating information. 46 Moreover,
because the subpoena is by its nature coercive, the vexing choice between
defection and silence in the face of misconduct is not the employee's own;
accordingly, there is less reason for his employer and colleagues to interpret his
testimony as disloyalty. Thus, while the risk that an employee's unapproved
speech will be disruptive to the internal workings of his employer is not zero in
the case of the employee who testifies about the corruption of colleagues, it is
sufficiently low as to be easily outweighed by the gain to efficiency and
effectiveness that results from having rooted out a corrupt employee or group
of employees.
The Huppert decision leaves government employees with the "catch-22" of
either not complying with a subpoena and being found in contempt of court,
or testifying only to be the subject of retaliation. Judge Tallman claimed that
state whistleblower statutes would fully protect government employees from
the harsh consequences of this "catch-22. ''47 But, even if state whistleblower
statutes do fully protect government employees against retaliation, Judge
Tallman's acknowledgment that these statutes are needed to prevent injustice
demonstrates that Huppert failed to "arrive at a balance" between the interests
of government employees and the interests of the government as an
employer. 48 Huppert sanctioned discipline that is not necessary for the efficient
46. See Amanda C. Leiter, "Whistle... and You've Got an Audience," 36 FORDH-IAM URB. L.J. 747,
761 (2009) (arguing that the most useful whistleblowers have access to relevant
information, have no political or personal axe to grind, and remain in good standing with
their employer).
47. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3 d 696, 710 ( 9 th Cir. 2009). But see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
44o (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing existing statutory whistleblower protections as "a
patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief"); Ruben J.
Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for
Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 22, 25 (2oo8) (arguing that "statutory
protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and sometimes counterproductive for public
employees").
48. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968).
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and effective working of government and, if unchecked by state whistleblower
statutes, allows government employers to retaliate against employees who have
had the bad luck of witnessing the corruption of colleagues and have been
subpoenaed to testify about it.
CONCLUSION
In Huppert, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by classifying a
government employee's subpoenaed testimony regarding the corruption of
colleagues as employee speech. This Comment has argued that Huppert was
wrongly decided under Garcetti. Not only is Garcetti's distinction between
citizen and employee speech best read as requiring that testimony be classified
as citizen speech, but the policy reasons that motivated Garcetti's holding that
employee speech is unprotected by the First Amendment are also at their
lowest ebb when a government employee gives subpoenaed testimony about
the corruption of colleagues.
LESLIE POPE
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